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Abstract—The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) provide an
opportunity for industries to build large interconnected systems
that utilise various technologies such as personal computers, wire-
less devices, and sensor devices and bring together the cyber and
the physical world. Such systems provide us with huge advantages
but they also introduce major security challenges at both the
design and runtime stages. The literature argues for the need
to introduce security-by-design methods, which enable security
analysis and mitigation of security threats. This paper proposes
a novel security-by-design method for IIoT environments across
two different levels, design/modelling and runtime/simulation.
Our method supports analysis of security requirements and
identification of attack paths and their integration for the mitiga-
tion of potential vulnerabilities. We demonstrate its applicability
through a real case study on a critical environment from the
maritime sector which demonstrates that our method helps to
identify security mechanisms to mitigate attacks on critical assets.
Index Terms—Industrial Internet of Things, Security Require-
ments Engineering, Attack Path Discovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
TECHNOLOGY is changing the way that we communi-cate, learn, and work. In the industrial sector, the num-
ber of computational components integrated into production
systems, transportation and logistics is rapidly increasing,
creating a large Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). It is
estimated [1] that the number of connected devices will reach
more than 70 billions in 2025. Such interconnected environ-
ment can provide major benefits, such as the monitoring of
the move of goods across a supply chain, from manufacturing
to distribution [2]. On the other hand, appropriate security
management approaches are required to ensure security of IIoT
environments. A major security challenge for IIoT is analysing
the connections between all different components, at physical
and cyber level, (e.g., devices, infrastructures, etc.) and the
potential vulnerabilities that arise from those connections [3],
[4] in order to limit unathorised access and mitigate potential
security attacks. For example, a device might be attacked
through exploitation of a component that is connected with
that device [5]–[7].
In responding to such challenge, security for IIoT must be
approached in a proactive manner. Such approach requires, on
one hand, the development of new systems (or the analysis
of existing systems) that follow security-by-design principles,
i.e. development and analysis based on security requirements
engineering; and on the other hand, approaching security
as a moving target where new developed attacks and new
vulnerabilities can be identified and their impact on the IIoT
environment is analysed. It is therefore important that we
develop methods that enable us, on one hand, to identify
security requirements, and model and analyse IIoT environ-
ments based on those security requirements (thus following a
security-by-design approach) and on the other hand, to enable
the identification of attack paths that an attacker could exploit
and provide analysis of the impact that those have.
This paper makes an important contribution to the security
of IIoT by proposing, to the best of our knowledge, the
first security-by-design method and demonstrate its applica-
bility through its applications to a real life IIoT scenario.
In particular, the proposed method supports analysis of IIoT
environments at two different levels. At the Modelling Level
the method provides a process and a modelling language that
supports the modelling and analysis of connections between
IIoT components, their security requirements, and for existing
systems, the current set of security mechanisms employed.
At the Simulation Level the proposed method provides a set
of algorithms that can automatically identify potential attack
paths and categorise the importance of such paths. The output
of the simulation level can be fed back to the modelling level
to identify extra security measures to mitigate the identified
attack paths.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section II
discuses related work, focusing on the security challenges of
IIoT and IoT, since the particular area of IIoT provides limited
results, on risk management approaches and on network based
attack path discovery studies. Section III presents our proposed
method while Section IV illustrates its application to a case
study in an IIoT environment from the maritime transport.
Finally, Section V summarises the conclusions and raises
issues for further research.
II. RELATED WORK
One of the novel aspects of our method is that it integrates
three different research areas, security analysis of complex
cyberphysical systems, such as the one of IIoT, risk manage-
ment approaches, and network based attack path discovery
approaches. For this reason, since there is no other method that
combines these three areas, we focused our literature review
on these three areas separately.
Security in IIoT and IoT In the demanding and challenging
area of IIoT limited work that examines security issues has
been identified. The authors in [8] examine and identify the
peculiarities of IIoT systems, and compare them to traditional
ones that affect the adaptation of existing information security
concepts. The authors argue that in such systems a holistic
cybersecurity concept for IIoT is required, able to address
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2the various security and privacy risks at all abstraction levels.
Another work that focuses on security of industrial sensors
in the context of the IoT has been conducted by [9]. The
authors analyse the features of the IoT and identify numerous
security challenges that must be solved, such as protocol
and network security services able to offer end-to-end secure
communication channels and the provision of authentication
mechanisms for identity management. Moreover, in order to
understand how the different approaches of IoT environments
can be secured, they analyse various attacker models, such
as DoS, physical damage, eavesdropping, node capture, and
controlling. They conclude that these different environments
can create new threats and facilitate attackers, but on the other
hand, can reduce the effectiveness of certain attack vectors.
We further extend our research by examining security in
IoT environments, in general. This approach will give us the
confidence that we have examined all the relevant aspects
related with security in such environments. Hence, we iden-
tified some recent studies in this direction. More specifically,
the authors in [10] have conducted an empirical investigation
regarding security of IoT applications, based on two real case-
studies. They identified that despite that security is considered
an important value for the IoT products, however, during
product development there is lack of practical consideration
of security. They also highlight the importance of tailoring
processes, able to address IoT-related security challenges. The
authors in [11] propose an IoT security model which aims
to capture security and privacy aspects, i.e. device protection,
device boot, authentication, communication, device monitoring
and reporting, personal data protection, and data transmission
security. However, this model is presented from a theoretical
perspective, and lacks providing any implementation approach.
The authors in [12] mention security threats in three layers of
IoT architecture. In front-end sensors and equipment, potential
threats refer to unauthorised access to data, threats to the
Internet and Denial-of-Service attacks. In the network layer,
they identify Denial-of-Service attacks and in the back-end of
IT systems they mention seven standards, i.e. privacy protec-
tion, access control, user authentication, communication layer
security, data integrity, data confidentiality, and availability at
any time. This work highlights the threats that are identified
in any layer of the IoT architecture, but it lacks of providing
specific solutions for the protection of the assets of the IoT
environment against those threats.
Risk Management In attack graph generation and analysis
several approaches can be found in the literature. In the
direction of risk assessment and risk management, the authors
in [13] present a parameterised cyber-attack path discovery
method which uses constraints and depth-first search for the
generation of attack paths that an administrator of a system
is interested in. Another approach for attack graph generation
for risk assessment is the one proposed by [14]. This method
provides scalability and is based on a cut and divide method
and a series of division round, while it uses depth-first search
to search the smaller graphs.
Network based attack path discovery Typically graph
construction takes place within a network to identify all
possible attack paths that can be exploited by attackers to
gain unauthorised access to the system. For instance, MulVal
is a well-established enterprise network security analyser that
is based on logic [15]. It models software bug interactions
along with network configuration, with data supplied by an
open source reporting community. Another tool for generating
attack graphs can be found in [16] with the name TVA. This
is a tool for topological network analysis, based on graph
dependency exploitation. In [17] the authors implemented an
intrusion detection system that produces a graph as output.
NuSMV [18] is another model checking tool that finds vul-
nerabilities and generates an attack graph. The work proposed
by [19] is yet another logic based approach that uses deduction
to form the attack graph. Solutions that are closer to our
method exist, with one found in [18] that uses a Breadth-
first search method to identify the vulnerabilities and build
the attack graph. Furthermore, more recent approaches exist
and offer different solutions to generate attack graphs. In [20]
the authors propose a distributed approach to attack graph
generation. This method is based on a multi-agent system, a
virtual shared memory abstraction and hyper graph portioning
to improve the performance. This method uses a Depth-first
search method where the performance is improved with the
use of multiple agents after a specific network size. It is also
shown that in small network sizes a single threaded approach
is faster. In [21] the authors propose the use of a dynamic
algorithm that generates an attack graph consisting of the top
K paths that there is a probability of being exploited.
In comparison to the above works, our work differentiates
as it provides a security-by-design approach, able to identify
security requirements in IIoT environments, from the early
stages of the development of a system, and based on these
requirements, to efficiently identify the critical attack paths
that a malicious user can exploit.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We propose a novel method for security modelling and
analysis of IIoT environments, which supports development
of secure IIoT environments at two levels, modelling and
simulation. Fig. 1 illustrates the main stages of the proposed
method. At the modelling level, the proposed method enables
(through a modelling and analysis process) modelling of an
IIoT environment component, and their dependencies (IIoT
Environment Analysis) along with security related issues,
such as security constraints, security threats and security
mechanisms (IIoT Environment Security Modelling). At the
simulation level, the method enables (through algorithms) the
identification of potential attack paths to the IIoT environment
along with a determination of the importance of those attack
paths. The results from the simulation can then be fed back
to the output of the modelling level to enable further analysis
(in terms of security measures identification) and mitigation
of the attacks that have been identified as important.
A. Modelling Level
The first stage (Stage 1) of the proposed method is the
IIoT Environment Analysis. During that stage, the aim is to
create a model of the IIoT environment, which includes all
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3Fig. 1. Process of the proposed method
the relevant IIoT components along with their dependencies.
The input for the creation of such model is information from
the relevant stakeholders related to the IIoT environment,
including information about components (physical, cyber and
human) and how they are related. To create the model, our
method is based on the Secure Tropos [22] modelling language
from the security requirements engineering area. In particular,
we enhance concepts of the Secure Tropos language such as
actor, dependency, plan and resource to enable us to model
the components and relationships between components of
IIoT environments. Using that approach, each IIoT component
(cyber, physical, human) is represented as an actor, which has
some strategic goals (functionalities or aims), relevant plans
(tasks) for achieving those goals and a set of assets (resources)
required for carrying out the plans. Moreover, each actor can
have a number of dependencies for goals/tasks that cannot
achieve on their own. To better understand the way that a
model created with our method can support the modelling
of IIoT environment, consider for example a software (actor)
used to control temperature (goal) to achieve that functionality
the software will have a number of goals. Some of those
goals can support independently, for some other functionalities
will require some input from other components (physical,
cyber or humans). These are modelled as dependencies. For
example, the software depends on a sensor (another actor)
to receive temperature readings (goal). The output of this
analysis is the creation of the IIoT Components model. That
model is then used as an input for Stage 2, the security
modelling. At this stage, we have enhanced the language
of the Secure Tropos [22] modelling language, to enable
modelling of security concerns related to IIoT environments,
including security requirements, security mechanisms, and
security related assets. In particular, our method supports
the modelling of security requirements in terms of security
constraints, which are security related constraints introduced
to the various components of an IIoT environment. Security
constraints restrict the various goals and plans that each
actor has. Going back to the temperature reading software
above, a security constraint is introduced related to the receive
temperature reading goal to ensure integrity of the temperature
reading. For each security constraint, our method supports
the identification of security mechanisms, which are measures
that can ensure the satisfaction of the security constraints. An
example of such mechanism for integrity is digital signatures.
Moreover, the method enables the identification and modelling
of potential threats. Threats are modelled at two levels, at
environment level where a threat is impacting one or more
goals of an actor, and on a technical level where a threat has
an impact on low level mechanisms. It is worth noting that at
a technical level, our approach is modelling individual threats,
as well as advanced persistent threats.
Our method allows developers to represent security con-
cerns at different levels of description, including cyber and
physical levels; and to verify at the modelling stage, whether
the identified security mechanisms shown in the model can
satisfy the security requirements of the IIoT system [23].
It is worth mentioning that models (for both stages) are
incrementally developed from a high abstraction level to a
more detailed level and from a system-as-it-is to a system-to-
be perspective [24]. The output of this stage is the Security
Requirements Model, which is used as input for the third stage.
B. Simulation Level
The simulation level Stage 3 of the proposed method takes
as input the IIoT assets that have been identified at the previous
stages and, using the algorithms we have defined, performs
a Vulnerability Analysis of the system that results in the
identification of potential attack paths and a quantification of
the importance of the various assets on such attack paths. In
our method, an attack path is the identification of one or more
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers to gain access
to specific assets and move between them in a network, thus,
forming an exploitable path between the assets.
Our work is based on a previously developed algorithm
found in [25], since it is highly parameterised. It takes input
the location and capability of the attacker, the asset graph,
and the max and propagation length (the depth of the graph
that will be searched), returning the affected assets and the
attack paths, or an empty graph, if no attack paths were found.
These outcomes are then fed to Algorithm 2, and thus finally
returning the prioritised hardware to hardware attack paths.
The algorithm is particularly useful when we want to perform
risk assessment in specific network parts that can be used in the
IIoT domain. Also, by tweaking its parameters, a prioritisation
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4of the vulnerability of these paths can be identified. This is
important in IIoT due to the large number of physical, human
and cyber components. Our simulation stage makes use of two
algorithms: Algorithm 1 to identify the various potential attack
paths, and Algorithm 2 to support analysis of certain network
parts and prioritise the paths. Due to lack of space, we are not
able to fully describe the algorithms of stage 3, but we provide
the pseudocodes, as shown below. Moreover, it is important
to note the following: (i) The capability of the attacker could
be either low, medium or high, while the location of the
attacker could be local, adjacent or network based. The entry
and target points specify which are the entry points that we
want to assess and which are the target points. (ii) The path
construction phase follows rules that belong to the propagation
and allow us to determine which vulnerabilities the attacker
can use to further penetrate the infrastructure to reach a
predefined target or to cause multiple damage by affecting
as many assets as possible from a given entry point/asset.
(iii) We examine how an attacker can exploit identified cyber
asset vulnerabilities in order to perform undesired actions. For
every attack, a set of related weaknesses, from the Common
Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) database, and vulnerability
types are defined. It is assumed that to perform this kind
of attack the attacker must have access to an asset that has
one or more vulnerabilities that are compatible with either the
weaknesses or the type defined. (iv) The asset configuration
includes information about a particular asset. For example,
the name of the asset, an id, the business partner to which
this asset belongs, its vulnerabilities, and attributes from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) repository, such
as access complexity and access vector. The entry point and
the target points are specific cyber assets on which a business
partner wants to focus on.
Algorithm 1: Attack path discovery
Input: Asset graph, max and propagation length, attacker
location and capability
Output: Affected assets, attack paths
#Load the graph and store it in memory
Load Asset graph from database
Create Graph data structure G and store the asset graph
For e in parameters entry points
If attacker location < required level of attacker location
OR attacker capability < required attacker capability
Return empty graph
Else
Get single source shortest path length
#Create list with all no-circular paths from entry e to target t
For entry point e
For target point t
If exists no-circular path from e to t
Add path to list
#Search the graph up to the specified length
Get all paths in the graph G from entry e to target t that are
up to the pre-specified path length
For the size of paths found
Add paths to attackpaths list
Add affected assets to affectedassets list
Return attack paths, affected assets
Algorithm 2: Prioritised hardware to hardware attack
path discovery
Input: Affected assets, attack paths (Algorithm 1 output)
Output: Prioritised hardware to hardware attack paths
Load affected assets
Load attack paths
For each attack path
Load the total number of vulnerabilities
For each vulnerability
calculate the importance of each vulnerability using
equation 1 (Step 1)
calculate the sum of the importance of each vulnerability
using equation 2 (Step 2)
Apply equation 3 to get the average vulnerability
importance (Step 3)
Load from the database the administration importance of
input and output hardware asset in the attack path (Step 4)
Create an attack path that contains only the hardware to
hardware asset
Add attack path from above to [prioritised hardware to
hardware attack paths] list
Apply equation 4 to each of the hardware to hardware attack
paths (Step 5)
Convert [prioritised hardware to hardware attack paths]
values in range 1 to 100 (Step 6)
return prioritised hardware to hardware attack paths
The summary of the steps and the respective (where
applicable) equations are shown below. Step 1: 0.6 * Impact
+ 0.4 * Exploitability (1)
Step 2:
∑n
1 value from equation 1 (2)
Step 3: Value f romStep2NumberofVulnerabilities (3)
Step 4: Fixed numerical value assigned from the
administrator when the asset is added to the database
Step 5: 0.6 * value from Step 4 + 0.4 * value from Step 3 (4)
Step 6: Convert to percentage
It is worth noting that for the coefficients in the above
formulas we consider the widely used values found in the
literature from CVSS to calculate the base score. Moreover,
impact and exploitability are values that are standard on CVE
(see an example at https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-
1769). Impact refers to the severity of a potential exploitation
and exploitability refers to how difficult is to exploit an asset.
Both these take values from 1-10. This means the proposed
method calculates risk based at how many CVEs might exist at
the relevant hardware, the sum of the scores of the CVEs and
the value of the administrator. The benefit of our approach is
that we also include the admin value on the calculation, which
our research indicated that this is important.
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5The selection of the attack paths to mitigate, as resulted
from the execution of Algorithm 2, is then fed back to Step 4,
in order to identify new security mechanisms to mitigate the
identified attack paths. In particular, the selection of the attack
paths is based on the administrator(s) who can set a threshold
for the selection of attack paths that will be mitigated. Once the
relevant attack paths are identified, the mitigation targets (in
terms of assets relevant to those paths) are further analysed, as
part of Step 4 of the modelling level stage 2 analysis, involving
the identification of extra security mechanisms for those assets
to mitigate vulnerabilities that have identified by the simulation
results and the verification at modelling level of those extra
security mechanisms.
IV. CASE STUDY
To better illustrate the applicability of the proposed method
we present how it is applied in an IIoT environment from
the maritime transport, which is considered as the backbone
of international trade and a key engine driving globalisa-
tion [26]. In a usual maritime port environment there are a
series of supply chain services, such as: i) Container Cargo
Management, ii) Vehicles Transport, iii) Liquefied Natural Gas
Transport, and iv) Bulk/General Cargo Transport. Due to space
limitations, we are focusing on the Vehicles Transport supply
chain service, which is considered as a massively complex
IIoT system with numerous components, including shippers,
IT systems, and transport operators that involve the shipment
and the reception of various types of vehicles and equipment
such as trucks, vans, truck trailers, threshing machines, etc.
This service is considered as a relatively long and complicated
process that involves domestic and international transportation,
warehouse management, order and inventory control, materials
handling, import/export facilitation, and information technol-
ogy. In this framework, it is clear that the vehicles transport
affects many sectors along the supply chain. Focusing again
on the Vehicles Transport supply chain service, it can be
broken down to a number of processes that involve several
physical (docking of the ship, stevedoring, loading, unloading,
storage, transportation, inspection, etc.) and cyber (pre-arrival
notifications, customs clearance documentation management,
International Ship and Port Facility Security declaration, etc.)
operations, interconnections and assets.
We apply the method presented in Section III, to model
security requirements of the vehicle transport supply chain
service, analyse relevant security mechanisms and threats,
and identify and mitigate attack paths. In this case study we
focus on one system, the one of Port Authority and their
dependencies with the Port Community system and with the
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
Following the stages of the proposed method, as illustrated in
Fig. 1, we split the application to two levels: modelling and
simulation. We describe those in the next two subsections.
A. Modelling Level
The first stage of the modelling level includes the IIoT
environment analysis, which involves identification of actors,
their goals and the dependencies among these actors, and
relevant assets, as illustrated in Fig. 2, and explained below.
In that figure, actors are represented as pink circles, goals
as green rounded rectangles, resources as yellow rectangles,
and plans as blue hexagons. Dependences are represented as
arrows from the depender actor to the dependee one. Actor
boundaries are represented as dashed pink rounded rectangles.
IIoT Environment Analysis: In the vessel docking process,
the Ship depends on the Ship Agent to obtain docking ar-
rangement. The actor Ship Agent uses the e-services offered
by the Customs Authority. Consequently, Ship Agent depends
on Customs Authority for obtaining “Customs Clearance Ap-
proval” document. Next, Customs Authority depends on the
Integrated Customs Information System to obtain “Customs
Clearance Approval” data. The Customs Clearance Approval
is the documented permission given by the Customs to import
or export vehicles and proves that all Customs duties have
been paid and shipment procedures have been approved. This
document has to be submitted by the Ship Agent to the
Port Authority. Once the Ship Agent obtains the Customs
Clearance Approval, they submit it to the Port Authority. So,
Port Authority is depended on Ship Agent in order to receive
the “Custom Clearance Approval”.
After the submission of the document, the Ship Agent
is dependent on the Port Authority in order to use their
services for the vessel, such as, mooring, lacing, assigning risk
assessment processes, weather conditions, navigational warn-
ings, procedures for communication failure, fenders, personnel
(truckers for transferring the vehicles from the ship to storage
area, etc.). Ship Agent requests the aforementioned services
for the vessel from the Port Authority and this process is
performed via the actor Port Community System, an elec-
tronic platform which connects the multiple systems operated
by a variety of organisations involved in the port’s supply
chain. Thus, Port Authority is depended on Port Community
System to i) receive the necessary information for the vessel
docking, and ii) provide e-port services. Actually, this system
acts as a centralised system that supports a variety of e-
port services aiming at facilitating the secure and efficient
electronic exchange and management of information between
the involved public and private stakeholders, and promoting
the automatisation and the smooth operation of the port and
logistics processes through a single request submission.
In this context, the Port Community System, in order to
check the “Custom Clearance Approval” document authen-
tication by data verification services, depends on the Inte-
grated Customs Information System, requesting the necessary
information via an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system,
and reports the result. The Port Community System depends
on the “Marine Traffic web platform” to obtain information
on vessels position and the Arrival/Departure timetable. This
information is obtained via the e-tracking (Marine Traffic
Internet AIS) services, hosted by the “Marine Traffic web plat-
form”. Then, once all relevant formalities have been arranged
by the authorised entities (i.e. docking clearance submission),
and the port’s equipment (yard tractors, forklifts with the
auxiliary equipment like sensors, etc.) and port personnel is
available to unload the vehicles and store them to the port’s
facilities, the Ship Agent informs the Ship about the docking
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6Fig. 2. IIoT Environment Analysis
arrangements. In the unloading vehicles process, when the
vessel arrives at the port, a SCADA system’s goal is to monitor
vehicles’ unloading from the vessel, which is performed by
yard tractors and forklifts with their auxiliary equipment. The
Port Authority depends on the SCADA system to i) monitor
the vessel unloading and ii) gather data from distributed
sensors and instruments. SCADA system analyses and displays
information improving the performance of vehicles shipping
operations, reducing waste of time and providing cost saving.
IIoT Environment Security Analysis: In Stage 2 the method
supports identification of security constraints, relevant security
mechanisms and security threats. For illustration purposes, we
focus the rest of the analysis on the Port Authority actor,
which is responsible for providing vessel services, such as
e-port services and for monitoring ship unloading, as shown
in Fig. 3. In that figure, red octagons represent security
constraints, while red hexagons with parallel lines represent
security mechanisms. This is a typical IIoT environment that
includes human, cyber, and physical components. In particular,
the Port Authority depends for the realisation of its two main
goals, on the Port Community System and the SCADA system.
We focus on the SCADA system, which is a computer-based
system that monitors and controls port industrial operations.
The ultimate goal of the SCADA system is to “monitor ship
unloading”, and this goal is achieved through two plans, the
“collection of telemetry data” and the “provision of statistical
control charts and reports”. Following the Identification of
security constraints (Stage 2, Step 1) of our method, we elicit
security requirements in the form of security constraints. For
our case study, the two plans of the SCADA system, namely
Collect telemetry data and Provide statistical control charts
and reports are restricted by the following security constraints:
Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality and Availability.
For each one of them we identify one or more security
mechanisms that support their satisfaction. Taking the Integrity
security constraint as an example, in IIoT environments in-
tegrity of the data should be preserved for protecting the data
against a sabotage, which might lead to unnoticed loss of
product quality and increased use of resources. Therefore, to
satisfy such security constraint the system includes Encryption
and Decryption. Similar analysis takes place for the rest of the
security constraints, where the various mechanisms that exist
in the system are modelled, as partially shown in Fig. 3.
Moreover, our analysis of the Collect telemetry data plan
has resulted in the identification of 38 assets, including Ar-
duino Microcontroller, Programming Logic Controller, Re-
mote Terminal Unit, Remote Control Station, Servers, Lap-
tops, and Mobile Devices. On the other hand, following the
identification of security threats step of the method, several
threats that impact the Collect telemetry data plan have been
identified, such as Code Overflow, Malicious Code Execu-
tion, Denial-of-Service, Man-in-the-Middle, Keylogging, Ob-
tain Privilege, Malware, and Phishing. For each threat we
indicate the impact it has on one or more areas of the system.
For example, Malware has an impact on the Collect Telemetry
Data plan, due to the possibility of an attacker exploiting
the Programming Logic Controller of the SCADA system
using malware. Our approach is not limited to generic types
of malware, but can also be applied in cases of Advanced
Persistent Threats (APT), which utilise any of the Threats
depicted in Figure 3 (e.g., the Stuxnet Worm [27]). The above
assets and threats, together with the security constraints, are
used as input for the vulnerability analysis stage.
B. Simulation Level
During the Vulnerability Analysis stage, we have executed
Algorithm 1 to identify potential attack paths. The execution
has resulted in the identification of 78 attack paths, which
contain both hardware and software assets. These assets are
then fed into the second Algorithm, where it only identifies
hardware to hardware paths and generates the Importance
percentage of each path, which is used in order to prioritise the
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7Fig. 3. IIoT Environment Security Analysis
sequence of the mitigation of each path. That means that the
attack paths with the highest importance has to be mitigated
first, as their damage in a potential cyber attack will cause
more critical problems to the system. It is worth mentioning
that for the identification of the threshold, we take into account
experts and stakeholders advice, who indicate, according to the
data they are provided, a relevant percentage, e.g., to proceed
with the mitigation of the first 10% of the identified attack
paths. Our analysis has identified 10 paths which have impor-
tance 100%. Consequently, these paths need to be mitigated
first. The assets that are included in these paths are presented
in Table I. The next step of Vulnerability Analysis involves
the selection of attack paths to mitigate. These attack paths
are then fed back to Step 4 of the IIoT Environment Security
Analysis, in order to identify new security mechanisms to mit-
igate them. For example, for attack path 22, to mitigate attacks
that affect the Integrity of the identified assets, we enhance the
security mechanisms to include Digital Signature and Data
Obfuscation, while to mitigate attacks that affect Availability
we enhance the security of the system to include mechanisms,
such as Mirroring Servers and Update Device Firmware. Each
of them supports specific vulnerabilities identified during our
analysis, for example the Update Device Firmware security
mechanism protects the Router asset of attack path 22 from
vulnerability CVE-2017-5521.
The application of our work to the above case study have
illustrated that the main challenges in terms of modelling and
analysing security issues in IIoT environments are related to
the need to understand, model and analyse security at various
abstraction levels, and across the multifaceted architecture
that such environments demonstrate. This helped us to better
design the process of the proposed method to enable analysis
TABLE I
ATTACK PATHS WITH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE
Path Affected assets
8 [Linux Server, Router, Remote Control Station, MS
Server]
18 [Laptop, Router, Linux Server, Desktop, MS Server]
19 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, MS
Server]
21 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, MS Server,
Linux Server]
22 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, Mobile
device, MS Server]
23 [Laptop, Router]
30 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, MS
Server]
39 [Laptop, Router, Linux Server, Desktop, MS Server]
40 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, MS
Server]
43 [Laptop, Router, Remote Control Station, Mobile
device, Server]
across such different abstractions levels. For example, the
modelling stage now includes modelling and analysis at two
different abstraction levels, i.e. environment and security,
rather than one level that was the original approach. Moreover,
the application of our work to the case study has identified
the need to focus the second algorithm to the prioritisation of
the hardware to hardware attacks and the need to include the
administrator input. Last but not least, the practical application
of our work revealed the need to introduce step 4 of stage 2
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8of the modelling level. In the original version of the method,
the output from the simulation was used as input to step 1 of
stage 2. However, this resulted in unnecessary analysis and it
was time consuming as the output of the simulation does not
change the security requirements.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a novel security method for security modelling
and analysis of such environments. This method aims to
support the development of secure IIoT environments at the
modelling and simulation level. As future work, we plan to
examine the applicability of our proposed security analysis
method to other complex environments, such as connected
cars and homes, and wearable devices. This will allow us to
understand in depth the challenges that these environments
face, the peculiarities that have to be addressed, in order to
protect the exchanged information of the distributed devices
and the service provision of all relevant actors, limiting the
number of incidents that can affect negatively the entire IIoT
environment. We also aim to extend our work by including
privacy requirements during the modelling and the analysis
of such systems. Through this extension we will be able to
preserve privacy on users’ data and identify the critical paths
that might have impact on users’ privacy requirements, such as
anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability, undetectability, and
so on. Finally, we plan to enhance the simulation level with
game theoretic approaches, so we can better identify mitigation
techniques for the identified attack paths.
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